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Abstract
Background Two theories explain how negative mood primes
smoking behaviour. The stimulus–response (S-R) account ar-
gues that in the negative mood state, smoking is experienced
as more reinforcing, establishing a direct (automatic) associa-
tion between the negative mood state and smoking behaviour.
By contrast, the incentive learning account argues that in the
negative mood state smoking is expected to be more reinforc-
ing, which integrates with instrumental knowledge of the re-
sponse required to produce that outcome.
Objectives One differential prediction is that whereas the in-
centive learning account anticipates that negativemood induc-
tion could augment a novel tobacco-seeking response in an
extinction test, the S-R account could not explain this effect
because the extinction test prevents S-R learning by omitting
experience of the reinforcer.
Methods To test this, overnight-deprived daily smokers (n=
44) acquired two instrumental responses for tobacco and
chocolate points, respectively, before smoking to satiety.
Half then received negative mood induction to raise the ex-
pected value of tobacco, opposing satiety, whilst the remain-
der received positive mood induction. Finally, a choice be-
tween tobacco and chocolate was measured in extinction to
test whether negative mood could augment tobacco choice,
opposing satiety, in the absence of direct experience of tobac-
co reinforcement.
Results Negative mood induction not only abolished the de-
valuation of tobacco choice, but participants with a significant
increase in negative mood increased their tobacco choice in
extinction, despite satiety.
Conclusions These findings suggest that negative mood aug-
ments drug-seeking by raising the expected value of the drug
through incentive learning, rather than through automatic S-R
control.
Keywords Incentive learning . Goal-directed learning .
Drug-seeking . Negativemood . Depression . Allostasis .
Discriminative stimuli . Motivating operations . Negative
reinforcement
Introduction
A key debate in contemporary addiction theory is whether the
transition from recreational drug use to clinical drug depen-
dence is driven by the emergence of automatic control over
drug-seeking (Everitt and Robbins 2013; Koob 2013) or su-
pernormal reinforcement value of the drug increasing inten-
tional choice of this commodity (Bickel et al. 2014; Heyman
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2013). As clinical drug dependence is comorbid with psychi-
atric illness (SAMHSA 2012; Swendsen et al. 2010), one
might recast this question as whether psychiatric states in-
crease automatic or intentional drug choice. To explore this
question, the current study used an outcome-devaluation assay
to test whether negative mood would increase goal-directed
drug-seeking in an extinction test, consistent with negative
mood exerting its effect on drug-seeking through intentional
rather than automatic processes (Hogarth 2012; Hutcheson
et al. 2001; Willner and Jones 1996). The study should con-
tribute to our understanding of how depression promotes drug
dependence (Breslau et al. 1998; Hitsman et al. 2013; Hughes
1999; Kassel et al. 2007) and provide insight into the mecha-
nisms underpinning the transition to drug dependence.
Most accounts of how negative mood promotes tobacco-
seeking draw inspiration from the self-medication hypothesis
(Khantzian 1997). The core idea is that smoking acutely alle-
viates negative mood, and this improvement in state back
towards homeostasis (Brody et al. 2009; Ramsay and Woods
2014) increases the reinforcement value of smoking (Hursh
and Silberberg 2008). Crucially, it is proposed that because
negative mood signals that smoking has greater rein-
forcement value, negative mood acquires the capacity
to prime smoking behaviour (Audrain-McGovern et al.
2014; Leventhal et al. 2014b).
Theories differ in their description of the mechanisms by
which negative mood comes to acquire control over smoking
behaviour. Early accounts described negative mood as an in-
ternal instrumental discriminative stimulus (SD) which ‘sets
the occasion’ (Skinner 1938) in which smoking behaviour is
more reinforcing, and thus comes to prime smoking behav-
iour, although exactly how was not well defined (Carmody
1989; Pomerleau and Pomerleau 1984).
This type of account was developed by negative reinforce-
ment theories (Baker et al. 2004), allostasis theories (Koob
2009; Koob and Volkow 2010) and incentive habit theories
(Belin et al. 2013). These accounts argue that experience of
the greater reinforcement value of smoking in the negative
mood state establishes a strong direct link between the nega-
tive mood state and the motor sequence of smoking. This
direct link has been variously described as automatic, uncon-
scious, preconscious, habitual and compulsive. In essence,
these theories have adopted Hull’s (Hull 1943) stimulus–re-
sponse/reinforcement (S-R) account of instrumental discrimi-
nation learning, wherein the negative mood state (S) acquires
capacity to directly elicit the motor sequence of smoking (R)
without retrieving an expectation of the reinforcer produced
by that response. Such S-R accounts are attractive because
they can explain how negative mood could prime smoking
behaviour automatically, bypassing the individual’s intentions
or beliefs about the nature of the drug and its current value.
Behaviour analysts have questioned S-R accounts of neg-
ative mood on the logical grounds that topographically
different smoking behaviours are required to produce rein-
forcement in different contexts (for instance, obtaining ciga-
rettes from a shop versus a machine requires different se-
quences). Negative mood is not sufficiently discriminating
on its own, they argue, to elicit the appropriate response se-
quence in each context via S-R mapping, because negative
mood is largely the same irrespective of context (Dougher
and Hackbert 2000; Laraway et al. 2014; Michael 1993;
Troisi 2014). For this reason, the behaviour analysts have
argued that negative mood is more accurately described as a
motivating operation (MO), rather than a SD, because it pre-
dicts the greater reinforcement value of smoking irrespective
of the specific response that is required to produce that rein-
forcer in the context. SDs by contrast, are typically external
cues which are scheduled to predict that a particular response
will produce an outcome. Consequently, they argue, the mo-
tivating operation, negative mood, should come to lower the
threshold enabling external discriminative stimuli to evoke the
specific response that produces the valued outcome in the
context. On this view, negative mood does not elicit smoking
directly (as predicted by S-R theory), but rather, modulates the
ability of external discriminative stimuli to evoke smoking.
Incentive learning theory has taken this type of modulatory
account further (Balleine et al. 1994; Dickinson and Balleine
2010; Heyes and Dickinson 1990; see also, Pittenger and
Bevins 2013). On this view, negative mood functions as an
internal motivational state, which is much like a MO in reli-
ably predicting that smoking has greater reinforcement value.
However, rather than automatically modulating the efficacy of
external SDs, incentive learning theory argues that smokers
learn from experience that in the negative mood state,
smoking is more reinforcing. This incentive learning experi-
ence enables the motivational state, negative mood, to subse-
quently retrieve an expectation that smoking currently has a
higher value, which manifests as subjective desire for that
outcome. This outcome expectancy is integrated with goal-
directed instrumental knowledge of which response produces
that outcome in the external discriminative context (Bradfield
and Balleine 2013; Trask and Bouton 2014), and this conjunc-
tion determines the selection and performance of the appro-
priate smoking response. Thus, incentive learning argues that
negative mood primes smoking behaviour via a conjunction
of explicit desire and instrumental belief, whereas the S-R
account proposes that negative mood primes smoking behav-
iour directly without intervening decision processes.
The incentive learning, MO and S-R accounts fall on a
continuum with the incentive learning and S-R accounts at
each extreme, so only the differential predictions of
these latter two positions will be explored in the remainder
of the paper. The incentive learning and S-R accounts make a
differential prediction as to whether the increase in self-report
desire to smoke associated with negative mood is causal or
epiphenomenal in driving smoking behaviour. Existing
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experimental data cannot readily distinguish these two posi-
tions because although desire and behaviour are commonly
correlated, causal control by desire over behaviour has not
been empirically confirmed. To be specific, studies have
shown that smokers who are prone to negative mood or are
depressed verbally report intentionally smoking in order to
alleviate negative mood (Lerman et al. 1996), and more often
report smoking as their most preferred activity (Audrain-
McGovern et al. 2014; Spring et al. 2003), show quicker la-
tency to smoke and greater willingness to pay for cigarettes
(Leventhal et al. 2014b) and show preferential selection of
smoking over money reinforcement in a concurrent choice
progressive ratio schedule (Audrain-McGovern et al. 2014).
Negative mood induction is associated with similar enhance-
ments of smoking motivation. Negative mood induction in-
creases self-reported desire to smoke (Brandon et al. 1996;
Payne et al. 1991; Perkins et al. 2013; Vinci et al. 2012),
increases smoking behaviour (Conklin and Perkins 2005;
Fucito et al. 2010; Payne et al. 1991) and increases response
rate in an instrumental progressive ratio task reinforced by
cigarette puffs (Willner and Jones 1996). Collectively, these
studies show that negative mood (trait or state) produces cor-
responding increases in a self-reported desire to smoke, instru-
mental tobacco-seeking and smoking behaviour. However, it
remains unclear whether self-reported desire is causal or epi-
phenomenal in driving smoking-related behaviour. Thus, the
empirical co-occurrence of desires and smoking behaviours
under negative mood, whilst suggestive, does not completely
resolve the issues of whether negative mood controls smoking
behaviour effect via incentive learning or S-R mechanisms.
Fortunately, the incentive learning and S-R accounts make
a second differential prediction that is more tractable to exper-
imental dissection—whether or not negative mood induction
could augment a novel tobacco-seeking response in an extinc-
tion test. The importance of the extinction test is that it pre-
vents the opportunity for direct experience of the greater value
of tobacco outcome in the negative mood state strengthening
the S-R association between the mood state and the tobacco-
seeking response. Thus, S-R theory predicts that negative
mood induction should not enhance a novel tobacco-seeking
response in an extinction test and could not readily explain
this effect if it was found. By contrast, the extinction test does
allow an expectation about the current high value of tobacco
evoked by negative mood to integrate with knowledge of the
response that produces that outcome, to augment performance
of the response. Consequently, the finding that negative mood
induction enhances a novel tobacco-seeking response in ex-
tinction would support the incentive learning account and dis-
confirm the S-R account of how negative mood primes
smoking behaviour.
The extinction test has become a standard procedure for
testing whether naturally reinforced responses (Balleine
et al. 1994; Kosaki and Dickinson 2010) or drug-seeking
responses (Corbit et al. 2012; Dickinson et al. 2002;
Hutcheson et al. 2001; Miles et al. 2003) are governed by
incentive or S-R learning in animals. In one key study,
Hutcheson et al. (2001) found that in animals that had experi-
enced the greater value of heroin in withdrawal, being shifted
to a state of heroin withdrawal augmented performance of a
heroin-seeking response in extinction, even though that re-
sponse had never before been reinforced in the withdrawal
state. Thus, withdrawal must have augmented heroin-
seeking by retrieving an expectation of the greater reinforce-
ment value of heroin, which integrated with goal-directed
knowledge of the response-heroin contingency, to augment
performance of that response. This increase in heroin-
seeking could not have been driven by the strengthening of
any S-R association controlling the response because the ex-
tinction test prevented direct experience of the greater rein-
forcement value of heroin in the withdrawal state modulating
the propensity to make the response through S-R learning.
Similar to Hutcheson et al. (2001), the current human pro-
cedure tested whether negative mood would function as a
motivational state raising the expected value of the drug in
the extinction test. In previous versions of the current human
design (Hogarth 2012; Hogarth and Chase 2011; Hogarth
et al. 2013), smokers first underwent concurrent choice train-
ing in which two key press responses earned points notionally
exchangeable for tobacco and chocolate rewards, respectively,
and participants reported explicit knowledge of these instru-
mental response-outcome (R-O) contingencies. Smoking to
satiety was then used to decrease the expected value of the
tobacco outcome. Finally, choice between the two responses
was tested in nominal extinction, where participants believed
that the responses continued to earn their outcomes, but these
outcomes were not displayed until the end (to prevent direct
experience of the outcomes modifying the tendency to make
each response in the extinction test through S-R learning).
These studies found that the devaluation treatment (smoking
satiety) reduced tobacco choice in the extinction test relative
to concurrent training. Thus, the tobacco-seeking response in
the extinction test was demonstrably governed by knowledge
of the current expected low value of the tobacco outcome in
the sated state, integrated with knowledge of the response-
outcome contingencies learned in the concurrent training
phase. This effect could not be explained by S-R learning,
because the extinction test prevented direct experience of the
current low value of the tobacco outcome weakening the S-R
association controlling the response.
The question at stake in the present experiment was wheth-
er negative mood induction (compared with positive mood
induction) administered immediately prior to the extinction
test would reverse/oppose the devaluation of goal-directed
tobacco-seeking produced by satiety, consistent with negative
mood functioning as a motivational state raising the expected
value of the drug. Numerous studies have shown that negative
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mood induction increases drug motivation, but it is not clear if
this effect can compete with primary motivational states. By
testing whether negative mood can counter drug satiety, we
can ascertain whether negative mood is a strong motivational
state, capable of competing with primary motivational states.
An important precedent for this ‘oppositional’ design comes
from Willner and Jones (1996). They found that smoking to
satiety reduced response rate on the progressive ratio schedule
in which cigarette puffs served as the reinforcer (also consis-
tent with Perkins et al. 1994; Perkins et al. 1997). Crucially,
negative mood induction partially reversed the devaluation
effect produced by satiety, raising response rates back towards
the abstinent baseline. Although negative mood opposed sati-
ety, it is not clear how, given that tobacco-seeking was rein-
forced with puffs at test. Negative mood may have augmented
tobacco-seeking by raising the expected value of tobacco or
by enhancing the experience of puffing reinforcement which
strengthened the S-R association controlling the response. The
key innovation in the present study was to test whether nega-
tive mood induction would reverse the devaluation of
tobacco-seeking in an extinction test. This effect would favour
the incentive learning over the S-R account of how negative
mood primes drug-seeking behaviour. More broadly, if mood
functions as a motivational state, opposing satiety, this would
extend the scope of incentive learning theory to include not
just primary states like hunger, thirst, cold, sexual arousal etc.
but to also include ‘higher-level’ psychiatric emotional states,
like sadness, regret, confusion, anxiety etc., providing princi-
pled insight into how these emotional states modulate goal-
directed behaviour (Dickinson and Balleine 2010).
Method
Participants
Participants were daily smokers (n=48; 50 % male) recruited
from students and staff at the University of Nottingham. All
were asked to abstain from smoking for at least 3 h prior to the
study, which amounted to overnight abstinence for the major-
ity. In order to increase compliance with abstinence proce-
dures, participants were informed that abstinence would be
confirmed with a breath CO measurement at the start of the
experiment (although this was not used as an exclusion crite-
rion). Exclusion criteria employed during initial e-mail vetting
were current use of illicit drugs except cannabis; aged less
than 18 or over 40 years of age; significant current or past
medical or psychiatric illness (including mood disorder); poor
physical health; allergies; or dietary sensitivities to chocolate.
Testing was between 10 a.m. and 5 p.m., lasting 1 h/subject.
During initial contact, participants were told that they would
be paid £10 for participation plus the additional chocolate and
cigarettes won in a computer task up to the value of £5. This
was a deception. At the end, during debrief, participants were
asked if they would be happy to receive £5 extra (£15 in total),
‘to save the experimenter having to restock the items’. All
participants accepted this. This arrangement ensures that par-
ticipants believe they are earning tobacco and chocolate dur-
ing the instrumental task, and mitigates the ethical problem of
paying participants in cigarettes. Informed consent was ob-
tained in accordance with the declaration of Helsinki, and
ethical approval was granted by the University of
Nottingham, School of Psychology Ethics Committee.
Procedure
Breath CO—baseline
After informed consent was obtained, participants were pre-
sented with a Bedfont Smokerlyzer and told that this device
measures the time of their last cigarette. Participants self-
reported their time of last cigarette (none reported smoking
within 3 h, consistent with instructions) before providing their
‘baseline’ exhaled CO reading.
Questionnaires
A questionnaire pack followed which included smoking his-
tory (age, cigarettes per day, years smoking, age of onset), the
Cigarette Dependence Scale (CDS-5; Etter et al. 2003) and the
Questionnaire of Smoking Urges (QSU; Tiffany and Drobes
1991).
Reward desire—baseline
Participants were then shown the rewards on the table: A
packet of ten cigarettes of their preferred brand and a 200-g
bar of Cadbury dairy milk (both sealed) above the keyboard
on the same side as the key that earned that outcome in the task
that followed. Their baseline desire for these rewards was
recorded with two questions: ‘To what extent do you agree
with the following statements? I would like to (smoke a cig-
arette right now/eat chocolate right now)’with a 7-point Likert
scale underneath ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly
agree’.
Concurrent choice—baseline
The aim of concurrent training was to establish two instru-
mental responses (key presses), which earn distinct reward.
Participants were faced with the physical rewards (a pack of
ten cigarettes of their preferred brand and a 200-g bar of
Cadbury dairy milk) and on-screen instructions which stated:
‘This is a game in which you can win the cigarettes and choc-
olate in front of you. In each trial, press the D or H key to see if
you have won a point for these rewards. You will only win on
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some trials. Press the space bar to begin’. Each trial beganwith
the centrally presented fixation cross, which remained until
either the D or H key was pressed. Pressing one key immedi-
ately presented the outcome text ‘tobacco point’, whereas
pressing the other key produced the outcome text ‘chocolate
point’, for 1 s. The response-outcome assignment was
counterbalanced between participants. Each key had only a
50 % chance of yielding its respective outcome. On non-
rewarded trials, the outcome text ‘nothing’ was presented. A
random inter-trial interval between 750 and 1250 ms interced-
ed between outcome offset and the fixation cross of the next
trial. There were 40 trials of concurrent training in total. Per
cent choice of the tobacco over the chocolate response was the
main measure, where 50 %=indifference, >50 %=tobacco
preference and<50 %=chocolate preference.
Contingency knowledge test
Immediately following concurrent training, participants were
tested for knowledge of the instrumental contingencies
through the on-screen questions: ‘Which key earned tobac-
co/chocolate, the D or the H key? Please choose carefully’.
The order of the two questions was randomised. Participants
who got either question wrong were excluded (n=4).
Devaluation by smoking satiety
All participants were then told: ‘We want to test how much
you like smoking. There will be a 10-min break in which you
can smoke as much or as little as you wish of a cigarette.
Please report the pleasantness of each puff you take on this
smoking satiety questionnaire’. On this questionnaire, partic-
ipants reported the pleasantness of each puff they consumed
on visual analogue scale, enabling quantification of the num-
ber of puffs consumed and the decline in pleasure rating from
the first to the last puff. Participants were escorted outside the
building to a smoking area and left alone during the smoking
period to minimise disturbance. The experimenter stated that
they would return when the time was up to facilitate ad libitum
consumption. The experimenter returned in 10 min.
Reward desire and breath CO - post devaluation
The impact of devaluation on tobacco and chocolate desire
was tested immediately after smoking satiety by participants
completing the desire questions again (as above). Breath CO
was recorded for a second time to quantify smoke exposure.
Mood state—baseline
To determine participants’ baseline mood, they were present-
ed with the on-screen question ‘How do you currently feel?’
with a 9-point Likert scale ranging from ‘Happy’ at 1,
‘Neutral’ at 5 and ‘Sad’ at 9.
Mood induction procedure
AVeltenmood induction procedure was then employed derived
from previous studies (Berna et al. 2010; Lenton and Martin
1991; Richell and Anderson 2004; Velten 1968). Participants
were presented with the instructions ‘You will now be shown a
series of statements that represent a particular type of mood.
Read each of the statements to yourself and focus your attention
on it. Your success at coming to experience this mood will
largely depend on your willingness to accept and respond to
the idea in each statement and to allow each statement to act
upon you. Attempt to respond to the feeling suggested by each
statement. Then try to think of yourself as moving into that
state. If it is natural for you to do so, try to visualise a scene
in which you have had such a feeling. Press the space bar to
begin’. Instructions were followed by 16 statements presented
for 10 s each in random order, separated by a random ITI of
2500 to 3500 ms. The two randomly assigned groups (positive
and negative) were exposed to different statements. The nega-
tive statements were: I feel a little down today; My work is
harder than I expected; Sometimes I feel so guilty that I can’t
sleep; I wish I could be myself, but nobody likes me when I am;
Today is one of those days when everything I do is wrong; I
doubt that I’ll ever make a contribution in the world; I feel like
my life is in a rut that I’m never going to get out; My mistakes
haunt me, I’ve made too many; Life is such a heavy burden; I’m
tired of trying; Even when I give my best effort, it just doesn’t
seem to be good enough; I don’t think things are ever going to
get better; I feel worthless; What’s the point of trying; I feel
cheated by life; Every time I turn around, something else has
gone wrong. The positive statements were: I feel cheerful and
lively; On the whole, I have very little difficulty in thinking
clearly; I’m pleased that most people are so friendly to me; I
can make friends extremely easily; I feel enthusiastic and con-
fident now; There should be a lot of good times coming along;
I’m able to do things accurately and efficiently; I know that I
can achieve the goals I set; I have a sense of power and vigour;
I’m feeling amazingly good today; I feel highly perceptive and
refreshed; I can concentrate hard on anything I do;My thinking
is clear and rapid; Life is so much fun; It seems to offer so many
sources of fulfilment; Life is firmly in my control; I’m really
feeling sharp now. Both groups listened to music during these
statements played through noise cancelling headphones. The
negative group received Barber’s Adagio for Strings, whereas
the positive group received Mozart’s Einekleine Nachtmusik
(Morrison and O’Connor 2008). A positive and negative mood
group were contrasted in an attempt to match the arousing
effects of the two mood conditions, whilst manipulating the
valence. A neutral group was not included because the contrast
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of the two more extreme groups offered the best strategy to
detect an effect.
Mood state—post-mood induction
To measure participants’ mood following mood induction,
they were again presented with the on-screen question ‘How
do you currently feel?’ with a 9-point Likert scale ranging
from ‘Happy’ at 1, ‘Neutral’ at 5 and ‘Sad’ at 9. The two
groups were expected to diverge in their mood compared with
their pre-induction baseline.
Extinction test
Finally, participants completed the concurrent choice proce-
dure again, in extinction, to evaluate the combined impact of
satiety and mood induction on tobacco-seeking. Participants
were presented with the on-screen instructions: ‘You can now
earn cigarettes and chocolate by pressing the D or H keys as
before. You will only be told how many of each reward you
have earned at the end of the experiment. You will also be
asked to examine the mood statements. Press the space bar to
begin’. The extinction test was identical to concurrent training
except that outcomes are omitted from trials. Thus, the initial
fixation cross appeared until a response choice was made,
which immediately launched the ITI before to the next trial.
In addition however, to ensure that the mood induction con-
tinued throughout this test phase, one of the mood statements
(randomly selected from the set of 16 for the group) was
presented for 3 s prior to the fixation cross of each choice trial,
and remained on until a response choice was made. The per
cent choice of the tobacco over the chocolate key was the main
measure. The question at stake was whether satiety and mood
induction would modulate the proportion of tobacco choices
in this extinction test relative to the baseline concurrent choice
phase.
Results
Participants
Four participants were excluded due to reporting incorrect
knowledge of the response-outcome contingencies after the
baseline concurrent choice stage, leaving 20 negative and 24
positive participants. Overall, participants were 23.8 years
(std=4.2; range=19–34) of age, smoked 9.5 (5.7; 2–23) cig-
arettes/day, had smoked for 6.2 years (4.8; 1–21), started at
15.9 years (2.6; 11–26) of age, had a CDS-5 score of 15.0 (4.0;
5–22) out of a maximum score of 25 and a QSU score of 4.2
(1.4; 1–7). There were no significant difference between the
negative and positive group with respect to these
characteristics, ts(42)<−1.28, ps>0.20, and there was also
no group difference in gender ratio, X2(1)=0.1, p=0.74.
Manipulation effects on self-report
Table 1 shows the effect of smoking satiety and mood induc-
tion on self-report measures and breath CO. The groups did
not differ in their experience of smoking satiety but did di-
verge with respect to mood following mood induction.
Specifically, analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the breath
CO data yielded a main effect of time (baseline, post-devalu-
ation), F(1.42)=45.42, p<0.001, ŋp2=0.52, demonstrating
that smoking took place during the satiety manipulation, and
there was no main effect of group or interaction between time
and group, F<1. The groups also showed no difference in the
number of puffs consumed, F(1.42)=1.3, p=0.26. ANOVA
with the reward desire data yielded no significant main effects
of interactions involving group, F(1.42)<2.62, p>0.11, but
revealed a significant interaction between reward (tobacco,
chocolate) and time (baseline, post-satiety), F(1.42)=89.98,
p<0.001, ŋp2=0.68. This interaction was due to desire for
tobacco significantly decreasing after satiety, F(1.43)=
145.29, p<0.001, ŋp
2=0.77, whereas desire for chocolate
showed no significant change, F(1.43)=3.15, p=0.08, ŋp2=
0.07. Thus, smoking satiety decreased smoking pleasure and
tobacco desire, comparably across groups.
ANOVAwith self-reported mood data yielded a significant
interaction between time (pre-induction, post-induction) and
group, F(1.42)=29.95, p<0.001, ŋp2=0.42, where the nega-
tive group reported a significant increase in negative mood,
F(1.19)=21.33, p<0.001, ŋp
2=0.53, and the positive group
Table 1 The effect of smoking satiety (top) and mood induction
(bottom two rows) on adjunct measures
Measure Group
Negative Positive
Breath CO—baseline 3.9 (0.8) 3.8 (0.6)
Breath CO—post-devaluation 5.7 (0.9) 5.7 (0.6)
Number of puffs 17.1 (1.4) 15.3 (1.0)
Pleasure first puff 79.5 (5.1) 83.9 (3.8)
Pleasure last puff 61.0 (5.9) 49.8 (5.9)
Desire tobacco—baseline 5.5 (0.3) 6.0 (0.2)
Desire tobacco—post-satiety 3.0 (0.4) 2.5 (0.3)
Desire chocolate—baseline 3.1 (0.4) 3.2 (0.3)
Desire chocolate—post-satiety 3.6 (0.4) 3.5 (0.4)
Mood state—pre-induction 3.2 (0.4) 3.3 (0.3)
Mood state—post-induction 5.6 (0.4) 2.8 (0.3)
Breath CO is in parts per million. Pleasure of puffs is per cent of visual
analogue scale. Desire scores are on a 7-point scale (positive numbers
equal greater desire). Mood state scores are on a 9-point scale (positive
numbers equal greater sadness) Numbers are mean and sem in brackets
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showed a significant increase in positivemood, F(1.23)=5.41,
p=0.03, ŋp
2=0.19. Thus, the two mood induction procedures
shifted mood in the expected directions.
Effects of satiety and mood on tobacco choice
Baseline concurrent training contained 40 choice trials, and
there was a significant linear increase in tobacco choice across
successive quarters (62, 69, 65 and 71 %), F(1.43)=6.20,
p<0.02, ŋp
2=0.13. For this reason, the final quarter (10 trials)
of the baseline concurrent choice task were employed as the
baseline. Figure 1 shows per cent tobacco choice at this base-
line and in the extinction test following satiety and mood
induction for the two groups. ANOVA with these data pro-
duced a significant interaction between group (negative, pos-
itive) and block (baseline, extinction), F(1.42)=5.4, p=0.02,
ŋp2=0.11, a significant main effect of block, F(1.42)=5.5, p=
0.02, ŋp2 =0.12, and no main effect of group, F<1.
Furthermore, the main effect of block was significant in the
positive group, F(1.23)=12.28, p=0.002, ŋp2=0.35, but not in
the negative group, F<1. These data indicate that satiety de-
creased tobacco choice in the extinction test relative to base-
line, consistent with previous findings (Hogarth 2012;
Hogarth and Chase 2011; Hogarth et al. 2013). However, this
devaluation effect was completely abolished by negative
mood induction, suggesting that negative mood functioned
as a motivational state raising the expected value of tobacco
in opposition to satiety.
Relationship between the change in self-reported mood
and tobacco-seeking
Previous studies have reported correlations between negative
subjective reactivity following induction procedures and sub-
sequent increases in drug motivation (e.g., Sinha et al. 2008).
This association was examined in Fig. 2, which shows that the
change self-reported in mood from pre- to post-mood induc-
tion correlated significantly with the change in tobacco-
seeking from baseline to the extinction test, r=0.43, p=
0.004. This correlation indicates that an increase in self-
reported negative mood was associated with an increase in
tobacco choice in the extinction test, reversing the effect of
satiety, which otherwise decreased tobacco choice. Multiple
regression analyses indicated that the absolute level of self-
reported mood measured pre-induction (p=0.11) or post-
inducted (p=0.073) did not predict the change in tobacco
choice, but the change in mood from pre- to post-induction
was the effective predictor (t=3.05, p=0.004). Thus, the acute
change in negative mood was the salient variable which in-
creased tobacco choice, rather than absolute negative mood
pre- or post-induction.
A standard median split procedure was used to group par-
ticipants into whether they showed a high or low change in
mood consistent with their mood induction procedure, shown
in Fig. 3a. ANOVA on thesemood change scores (pre- to post-
induction) with the factor sub-group (4) yielded a significant
main effect , F(3.40) = 48.06, p < 0.001, ŋp
2 = 0.78.
Furthermore, contrasts of pairs using Bonferroni post-hoc
tests indicated that the high-negative (n=11) and high-
positive (n=13) sub-groups differed from all other sub-
groups, ps≤0.003, whereas the low-negative (n=9) and low-
positive (n=11) sub-groups did not differ from each other
(p=1). Finally, the high-negative sub-group’s mood change
was significantly greater than zero, t(10)=9.38, p<0.001,
Fig. 1 Mean per cent tobacco versus chocolate choice (±SEM) at
baseline and extinction test for the negative and positive mood
induction group (50 %=indifference; >50 %=tobacco preference;
<50 %=chocolate preference). The extinction test was conducted after
satiety and mood induction, revealing the combined effect of these
variables on goal-directed tobacco-seeking. Satiety reduced goal-
directed tobacco-seeking in the positive group, but this effect was
abolished by negative mood induction
Fig. 2 Relationship between the change in self-reported mood (pre- to
post-mood induction), with the change in tobacco choice (from baseline
to extinction test with satiety mood induction in between). Positive mood
values reflect increased sadness, whereas negative values reflect in-
creased happiness. Positive tobacco choice scores reflect increased tobac-
co choice, whereas negative scores reflect decreased tobacco choice.
Symbols identify the four sub-groups employed in Fig. 3: high positive
(filled squares), low positive (empty squares), low negative (empty
circles) and high negative (filled circles) who did and did not show sig-
nificant changes in mood following induction. The scatterplot shows that
increased negative mood was associated with increased tobacco choice at
test, opposing satiety
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and the high-positive sub-group’s mood change was signifi-
cantly less than zero, t(12)=−7.67, p<0.001, whereas the low-
negative and low-positive sub-groups combined showed no
significant change in self-reported mood, t(19)=1.76, p=0.09.
The important analysis concerns change in tobacco choice
by the four sub-groups, the mean and SEM for which is shown
in Fig. 3b. ANOVA on tobacco choice data with the variable
sub-group (4) yielded a significant main effect, F(3.40)=5.54,
p=0.003, ŋp2=0.29. Furthermore, contrasts of pairs using
Bonferroni post-hoc tests indicated that the high-negative
sub-group differed from all other sub-groups, ps≤0.02, where-
as the remaining three sub-groups did not differ from each
other (ps=1.0). Within-groups t tests indicated that whereas
the high-negative sub-group showed a significant increase in
tobacco choice at test, t(10)=2.32, p=0.04, the remaining
three sub-groups combined showed a significant decrease in
tobacco choice at test, t(32)=−4.47, p<0.001. These within-
group t tests were significant even when the Holm–Bonferroni
correction was applied. Finally, there was no reliable differ-
ence between the four sub-groups with respect to baseline
choice, F<1, nor when baseline choice was contrasted be-
tween the high- and low-negative group, F<1, or high- and
low-positive group, F<1, indicating comparability of tobacco
choice at baseline. Thus, a significant increase in self-reported
negative mood augmented tobacco choice opposing satiety,
whereas variations in self-reported positive mood had no im-
pact on tobacco choice.
Importantly, the two negative sub-groups were not con-
founded with respect to their experience of the devaluation
treatment—they showed no reliable difference in breath CO,
number of puffs consumed, pleasure of puffs consumed or
desire for tobacco, Fs<1—nor were they confounded with
respect to participant characteristics—they showed no reliable
difference in age, cigarettes smoked per day, years smoking,
age of smoking onset, CDS-5 or QSU scores, ts(18)<1.2, ps>
0.23. Thus, increased self-reported negative mood was the
crucial factor increasing goal-directed tobacco choice, oppos-
ing satiety.
Discussion
The study of young adult daily smokers found that smoking
satiety decreased tobacco-seeking in the extinction test of the
outcome-devaluation procedure, compared with the abstinent
baseline, replicating previous studies (Hogarth 2012; Hogarth
and Chase 2011; Hogarth et al. 2013). This devaluation effect
indicates that tobacco choice is goal directed in being deter-
mined by knowledge of the response-outcome contingencies
acquired in concurrent training combined with knowledge of
the low value of the tobacco outcome in the sated state (incen-
tive learning). The novel finding of the current study was that
this devaluation effect on goal-directed tobacco-seeking pro-
duced by satiety was abolished by negative mood induction
(compared with positive mood induction). This abolition of
the devaluation effect shown in Fig. 1 is ambiguous in its
interpretation. This effect could be produced by negative
mood impairing retrieval of goal-directed knowledge at test,
resulting in no change in responding, as has been found with
stress induction (Schwabe and Wolf 2009, 2010), acute alco-
hol (Hogarth et al. 2012) and alcohol expectancy (Hogarth
et al. 2013). Alternatively, the abolition of the devaluation
effect in Fig. 1 could be produced by negative mood (relative
to positive mood) functioning as a motivational state, raising
the expected value of tobacco opposing satiety in the control
of goal-directed tobacco-seeking (c.f. Willner and Jones
1996). According to the incentive learning interpretation, neg-
ative mood has acquired similar incentive properties to drug
withdrawal, which has been shown to raise the expected value
of the drug controlling drug-seeking in a direction opposite to
Fig. 3 a Change in self-reported mood (pre- to post-induction) in four
sub-groups. Positive mood values reflect increased sadness, whereas neg-
ative values reflect increased happiness. The high-negative group showed
a significant increase in sadness, the high-positive group showed a sig-
nificant increase in happiness, and the two low groups showed no signif-
icant change in mood. b Change in tobacco choice (from baseline to
extinction test with satiety mood induction in between) in the four sub-
groups. Positive tobacco choice scores reflect increased tobacco choice,
whereas negative scores reflect decreased tobacco choice. The high-
negative group showed a significant increase in tobacco choice despite
satiety, whereas the remaining three sub-groups all showed a significant
decrease in tobacco choice
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satiety (Hutcheson et al. 2001). The incentive learning inter-
pretation also accords with other animal studies which have
shown that if internal states which predict opposite values of
the reinforcer are manipulated simultaneously, they produce
opposing effects on goal-directed action selection in the ex-
tinction test similar to that found here (Balleine et al. 1994;
Balleine and Dickinson 1994; see also, DeGrandpre et al.
1992; Troisi et al. 2012; Weiss 1972; White and Stolerman
1996).
The sub-group analysis distinguishes between the impaired
goal-directed control and the incentive learning accounts of
Fig. 1. The sub-group analysis of Fig. 3 showed that partici-
pants who reported a significant increase in negative mood
significantly increase their tobacco choice in the extinction
test, whereas all other participants significantly decreased their
tobacco choice in the extinction test. This finding cannot be
explained by negative mood impairing goal-directed control
because this process would produce no change in choice at
test. By contrast, the increase in tobacco choice in the high-
negative group can be explained by negative mood function-
ing as a motivational state raising goal-directed tobacco-seek-
ing in opposition to satiety.
The post-hoc nature of the assignment of participants to the
sub-groups means that a range of confounding factors could
explain the increase in tobacco choice in the high-negative
group other than the increase in negative mood per se.
Several potential confounds can be excluded however.
Multiple regression analysis indicated that the increase in
goal-directed tobacco-seeking was uniquely predicted by the
increase in negativemood, rather than absolute negativemood
either before or after induction. In addition, the sub-groups
were comparable in their baseline tobacco choice, demograph-
ic variables and experience of the devaluation treatment, sug-
gesting these variables were not responsible for the increase
goal-directed tobacco choice. Finally, the two positive sub-
groups did not differ in their change in tobacco choice, so
one might conclude that it was negative mood specifically,
rather than general arousal produced by the induction proto-
col, which increased goal-directed tobacco choice at test.
However, we did not measure the general arousal induced in
each sub-group, so it remains possible that greater arousal,
rather than negative mood per se, drove the increase in tobac-
co choice in the high-negative group (perhaps akin to a stress
induction procedure). This issue remains to be explored.
Finally, a range of unmeasured individual differences such
as depression symptoms (Audrain-McGovern et al.
2014) might have been confounded with the sub-group
assignment and driven the increase in tobacco choice at
test. Future studies should seek to fully characterise in-
dividual differences in sensitivity to negative mood in-
duced priming of goal-directed drug-seeking.
Theories which claim that negative mood primes tobacco-
seeking via direct, automatic, unconscious, habitual or
compulsive associations, including negative reinforcement,
allostasis and incentive habit theory (Baker et al. 2004;
Belin et al. 2013; Koob 2009; Koob and Volkow 2010), might
seek to defend their position by attributing the current effects
to the formation of S-R associations within the task. There are
three principled objections to this claim. First, on the S-R
account, changes in responding can only be brought about
by direct experience of the outcome modifying the S-R asso-
ciation controlling the response (Dickinson 1985; Dickinson
and Balleine 2010). As outcomes were omitted in the extinc-
tion test, the change in responding produced by satiety and
negative mood could not be driven by changes in S-R strength
driven by a change in the direct experience of the tobacco
outcome, but must have been mediated by an expectation of
the tobacco outcome. Second, negative mood was induced
between baseline concurrent training and the extinction test,
such that the tobacco-seeking response was never reinforced
in the presence of the negative mood state. Consequently,
negative mood could not have formed an S-R association with
the tobacco-seeking response to control performance at test.
Third, if S-R associations have formed between negative
mood and smoking behaviour in the natural environment,
such learning could only generalise to promote tobacco over
chocolate-seeking at test via a representation of the reinforcer
shared between these specific responses, and this proposal is
beyond the scope of S-R theory.
One final defence of S-R theories would be to suggest that
the current evidence that negative mood functions as a moti-
vational state raising the expected value of drug reinforcement
does not exclude the possibility that negative moodmight also
undergo S-R learning with respect to responses which have
been directly reinforced in the mood state. Moreover, such S-
R based control by the negative mood state over drug-seeking
might bemore pronounced inmore dependent or psychiatry ill
drug users, accounting for their transition to clinical drug de-
pendence. Consistent with this view, there is some evidence
that smoking behaviour is more prone to habitual control,
indexed by its null correlation with subjective craving, com-
pared with a novel tobacco-seeking response, in more impul-
sive smokers (Hogarth 2011; see also, Gass et al. 2014).
Despite this, the burden of proof currently rests on habit the-
orists to provide positive evidence that negative mood can
acquire S-R control over drug-seeking in ‘ecologically valid’
schedules that mimic complex human learning environments
(Kosaki and Dickinson 2010; Sjoerds et al. 2014).
A difficult question remains as to how negative mood be-
comes established as a signal for the greater reinforcement
value of smoking, because there is little evidence that negative
mood induction actually increases the liking of smoking
(Perkins et al. 2010a); although stress induction does increase
smoking liking (McKee et al. 2011; Zinser et al. 1992) and
studies are somewhat equivocal as to whether depression
prone smokers report increases in smoking liking (Audrain-
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McGovern et al. 2014; Perkins et al. 2010b). Furthermore,
even though smokers who report depressed mood claim to
smoke to alleviate depression (Lerman et al. 1996), there is
also little evidence that smoking alleviates either exper-
imentally induced negative mood (Conklin and Perkins
2005; Kassel and Shiffman 1997; Kassel and Unrod
2000; Perkins et al. 2008, 2010a; Willner and Jones
1996), or depression (Colman et al. 2011). On the con-
trary, long-term abstinence appears to improve depres-
sion (Cavazos-Rehg et al. 2014; Mathew et al. 2013;
Piper et al. 2013; Prochaska et al. 2008; Shahab et al.
2013). Therefore, in subjective report at least, there is
little indication that negative mood and depression are
associated with the greater reward value of smoking.
This problem for the self-medication hypothesis has been
answered in at least two ways (Kassel et al. 2003; Khantzian
1997). One answer is that induced negative mood and depres-
sion mimic withdrawal-related negative mood (Baker et al.
2004; Heilig et al. 2010; Hughes 2007; Parrott 1999), which
is reliably alleviated by smoking (Hatsukami et al. 1984;
Hughes et al. 1984; Parrott 1995; Perkins et al. 2010a). On
this view, negative mood is a partially reliable predictor of the
greater reward value of smoking. One objection to this claim
is that if negative mood was a partial predictor, it should not
have competed so effectively against the more reliable predic-
tor, satiety, for the control over tobacco-seeking (White and
Stolerman 1996).
Another possibility is that the correction of anhedonia (en-
gagement with reinforcers) by smoking, rather than correction
of negative mood per se, provides the additional reinforce-
ment signal. Support for this claim comes from the finding
that anhedonia increases during abstinence and predicts re-
lapse (Goelz et al. 2014; Leventhal et al. 2008, 2014a) and
can be corrected by acute smoking or nicotine (Dawkins et al.
2006; Donny et al. 2003; Liverant et al. 2014; Pergadia et al.
2014; Perkins and Karelitz 2013; Powell et al. 2002). On this
view, smoking is more reinforcing in the negative mood state
because it alleviates co-occurring anhedonia, increasing en-
gagement with natural rewards (Ahmed and Koob 2005) rath-
er than ameliorating negative mood per se. As anhedonia in-
creases with the transition clinical drug dependence (Koob
2013), and withdrawal-related anhedonia is more pronounced
in depressed individuals (Pergadia et al. 2014), negative mood
should become a more powerful motivational state, raising the
expected value of the drug, as dependence grows. Thus, in-
centive learning driving supernormal goal-directed drug
choice to acutely correct burgeoning anhedonia could be the
learning mechanism that underpins the transition to clinical
drug dependence, consistent with choice based theories
(Bickel et al. 2014; Henden et al. 2013; Heyman 2013) over
automaticity theories of dependence (Belin et al. 2013; Everitt
and Robbins 2013; Koob 2013; Koob and Volkow 2010;
Tiffany 1990).
As depression and anhedonia are associated with reduced
learning about natural reward contingencies in smokers
(Liverant et al. 2014; Pergadia et al. 2014), it is possible that
negative mood simultaneously reduced the value of chocolate
and increased the value of smoking, expanding the differential
value between these two outcomes, driving up the proportion
of tobacco choices (this could explain why the high-negative
group chose tobacco above their abstinent baseline). The con-
current choice procedure means that we cannot rule out the
possibility that negative mood reduced chocolate value.
However, there is substantial evidence that negative mood
augments the value of smoking when tested independently
of a natural reward alternative (Brandon et al. 1996; Conklin
and Perkins 2005; Fucito et al. 2010; Payne et al. 1991;
Perkins et al. 2013; Vinci et al. 2012; Willner and Jones
1996), so we can be confident in this aspect of the interpreta-
tion. By contrast, Conklin and Perkins (2005) found no
change in motivation for water following negative mood in-
duction, suggesting that negative mood does not reduce natu-
ral reward value. Furthermore, depression is prospectively
linked to developing obesity, suggesting that negative
mood may not undermine food motivation (Luppino
et al. 2010). Nevertheless, the possibility that negative
mood changes the value of both two outcomes, to bias
action selection, remains an important consideration that
requires direct testing.
One remaining question concerns the relevance of the cur-
rent findings to depression. Depression is a heterogenous dis-
order made up of a cluster of symptoms including negative
mood, anhedonia, cognitive impairment, concentration diffi-
culty, neurovegetion, psychomotor retardation, appetite loss
and insomnia. It is unlikely that the mood induction procedure
used in the current study impacted on depressive symptoms
outside negative mood, particularly the non-affective symp-
toms. Therefore, the study cannot speak about the role these
other symptoms play in the maintenance of drug use. The
other issue is that major depression is more severe and chronic
than the transitory induced negative mood state. A diagnosis
of depression requires that depression lasts for at least 2 weeks
and is associated with a clinically significant change in func-
tioning. Thus, there are both qualitative and quantitative dif-
ferences between mood induction and depression. This anal-
ysis does not discount the importance of the present findings.
Indeed, the present findings may have more broad spanning
implications beyond depression, addressing how negative af-
fect modulates expected outcome values in healthy people and
across those with different clinical diagnoses, including de-
pression, anxiety and psychoses, all of which have an affective
component. Finally, our major claim that emergent, abnormal
incentive learning underpins the transition to drug dependence
is undermined by young health smoker cohort studied here.
Extensive testing in clinical samples is requires before this
claim becomes anything more than a plausible possibility.
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To conclude, numerous studies have shown that negative
mood induction increases drug motivation, but it was previ-
ously unclear if this effect could compete with primary moti-
vational states. Our unique finding that negative mood fully
countered satiety demonstrates that negative mood is a strong
motivational state, capable of competing with primary moti-
vational states. Furthermore, negative mood increased drug-
seeking in an extinction test suggesting that negative mood,
relative to positive mood, functions as a motivational state as
envisaged by incentive learning theory, raising the expected
value of the drug to drive goal-directed drug-seeking. This
finding contradicts S-R theories which claim that negative
mood controls drug-seeking directly. More speculatively, the
data might suggest that psychiatric illness writ large confers
vulnerability to drug dependence not by promoting automatic
control of behaviour but by enabling incentive learning,
wherein psychiatric states drive supernormal goal-directed
drug choice in order to acutely correct (but ultimately exacer-
bate) those psychiatric states.
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